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an Thornton has written a very interesting
paper on estimating the liquidity effect at
the daily frequency. The paper starts with
a nice discussion of the historical origins of the
term “liquidity effect” (tracing it back to Milton
Friedman, but somewhat surprisingly, no farther).
The paper then discusses ways to identify the
liquidity effect in daily data, and applies this
discussion to critique the recent methodology of
Hamilton (1997). The paper finds that the Hamilton
results are not robust across sample periods and
appear to be sensitive to outliers. Finally, the paper
proposes an alternative way to estimate the liquid-
ity effect via the relationship between nonborrowed
reserves and the target funds rate. Here the paper
has mixed success. Some variables seem highly
correlated in the appropriate way, but the basic
relationship between nonborrowed reserves and the
target federal funds rate appears fragile—often it
is insignificant, and sometimes it is the wrong sign.
In my discussion, I intend to provide a brief
overview of the literature on liquidity effects, fol-
lowed by a very simple exposition of a model along
the lines of the one presented in the paper. I use
this model to illustrate the basic arguments in the
paper, and then by changing the assumption re-
garding the relationship between the Open Market
Desk’s (OMD) operating procedure and the desired
level of nonborrowed reserves, I argue that we may
have reason to expect biased and econometrically
fragile parameter estimates from the nonborrowed
reserves equation that is estimated in the paper.
The modern macroeconomic literature on
liquidity effects can be divided into two separate
strands: the theoretical literature that examines
whether the current generation of dynamic general
equilibrium models can generate a liquidity effect
in response to innovations in money growth rates,
and the identified vector autoregression (VAR)
literature which examines whether there exists a
contemporaneous negative relationship between
money and nominal interest rates in response to
monetary policy innovations. In the theoretical lit-
erature there are two types of models that are
capable of generating a liquidity effect: limited
participation, cash-in-advance models with
heterogeneous agents; and sticky-price models
that generate a demand for real balances through
a transactions demand for money or, equivalently,
money in the utility function. In both types of
models, the theoretical difficulty with generating
a liquidity effect stems from the fact that, with
positively autocorrelated money growth, a rise in
money growth today leads to anticipated infla-
tion. Such anticipated inflation tends to push the
nominal interest rate up rather than down, even
if the real interest rate is falling in response to the
innovation in money growth. Under certain param-
eterizations, either model may deliver a liquidity
effect. Such parameterizations often involve im-
posing restrictions on quantity responses, either
through inflexible production—as in the recent
example of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995)—
or through the use of substantial curvature of the
transactions benefits associated with real bal-
ances, combined with a limited response of
interest-sensitive components of spending such
as investment. In these frameworks, the response
of money-demand to interest rates is a key model
parameter that helps determine the liquidity
effect.
The second strand of this literature using
identified VARs to estimate the liquidity effect in
time series data also has mixed success, with results
depending on specification, sample period, and
methods of identification. The problem here is
that the assumptions required to identify monetary
policy innovations and, hence, the liquidity effect
in this literature are not necessarily valid; for
example, the specifications considered by Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) both deliver liquidity effects by imposing
the assumption that monetary policy does not
have contemporaneous effects on output or prices.
Avoiding these types of restrictions motivates
Hamilton’s use of daily data and his search for a
valid instrument. Let me discuss this methodology
by considering a simple version of Thornton’s
model for the daily federal funds market.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE FEDERAL
FUNDS MARKET
I assume that demand for total reserves depends
negatively on rt, the current overnight federal funds Simon Gilchrist is a professor of economics at Boston University.80 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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rate, and positively on vt
d, an i.i.d. shock to reserve
demand 
(1)
For simplicity, I abstract from discount-window
borrowing and assume that total reserves supply
depends on Bt, the current level of nonborrowed
reserves, and vt
s, an i.i.d. shock to reserve supply:
(2)
Monetary policy is specified through the relation-
ship between Bt
*, the desired level of nonborrowed
reserves, and rt
–, the target level for the federal funds
rate. In particular, Bt
* is chosen as in Thornton’s
model so that expected reserve supply equals
expected demand at the target rate of interest: 
(3)
Lastly, following Thornton, I specify the relationship




where ωt represents control error which is assumed
to be i.i.d. Equation (4) may be thought of as the
OMD’s operating instructions given its desired level
of reserves Bt
*. Here, the Trading Desk chooses
desired reserves to minimize the error between
actual and desired reserves on a daily basis. Equat-
ing supply and demand and applying equations (3)
and (4), we obtain the reduced form equation for
the federal funds rate as a function of the target
rate and the i.i.d. shocks to demand and supply 
(5)
(6) .
In this simple model, Hamilton’s procedure re-
duces to a regression of the federal funds rate on
the target rate and vt
s an observable component
of the shock to supply (the forecast error in Trea-
sury balances). The coefficient on vt
s allows one
to identify the slope of the demand curve λ. Given
inelastic supply, we only need one reduced form
equation to identify λ. In Thornton’s more general
model, the supply curve is an upward-sloping
function of the federal funds rate through the
supply for borrowed reserves. In this case, as in
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form for both the price and quantity equation to
identify λ.
Thornton’s critique of Hamilton is two
pronged. The first prong of criticism is directed
at the Treasury balance forecast error constructed
by Hamilton. This variable was constructed using
a VAR forecasting system. By obtaining the actual
forecast errors made by the Board of Governors and
the Treasury, Thornton notes that the VAR-based
error has substantially higher variance, suggesting,
unsurprisingly, that the VAR-based forecast error
does not use all information available to the Federal
Reserve and is thus subject to measurement error.
Pure measurement error would lead to a down-
ward bias in the coefficient estimate of (1/λ) and
hence upward bias in the estimate of λ itself. To
the extent that the difference between the two
forecast errors reflects information that is used to
set monetary policy, the VAR-based error is no
longer a valid instrument. These arguments strike
me as reasonable, and the paper makes a valuable
contribution to the literature by documenting and
discussing such distinctions.
The second prong of criticism is directed at
the robustness of Hamilton’s findings. By collecting
a larger data sample unavailable to Hamilton at
the time, Thornton examines the robustness of
Hamilton’s findings across sample periods. Unfor-
tunately, the liquidity effect only appears in the
middle period that reflects Hamilton’s data. Further-
more, the results appear to be due to a limited
number of data points that involve, simultaneously,
large movements in the Treasury balance and the
federal funds rate. In addition, owing to the timing
of the reserve maintenance period, the parameter
estimates obtained by this procedure cannot reflect
the coefficient λ in the transactions demand equa-
tion specified by Thornton. More likely they reflect
some component of the demand for excess reserves.
Again, Thornton does a persuasive job documenting
the fragility of such results. One lesson to be drawn
here is that any estimates of “structural parameters”
based on the daily federal funds market must care-
fully consider the institutional detail of the market
and how it changes over time. By and large, both
Hamilton and Thornton exhibit such care, though
what one obtains from one sample period may
still not match what one obtains from another.
As an alternative methodology, Thornton sug-
gests estimating λ by regressing nonborrowed
reserves on the target level of the funds rate. In
the context of this simple model, such a procedureFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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implies estimating the relationship between Bt and
rt
– embedded in equations (3) and (4):
(7)
In the data, we should add suitable controls for
other variables such as the discount-window
borrowing that modify the relationship between
nonborrowed reserves and the target funds rate.
Thornton does more than that, however, adding
both levels and changes in the target along with a
host of right-hand-side variables, only some of
which are justified by his model. While compre-
hensive, such an all-inclusive approach makes it
difficult to get a solid fix on λ. At best, we can
hope to identify the negative relationship implied
by the theory. In the rest of my discussion, I wish
to consider an alternative source of bias that could
make estimation of equation (7) difficult.
A MODEL WITH PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT
Consider a slight variant on the OMD’s operat-
ing procedure that allows for partial adjustment
along the lines considered by Taylor (2001) also
found in this volume:
(8)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8)
implies that the OMD does not immediately close
the gap between desired and actual nonborrowed
reserves, but does so with some adjustment process.
Although not motivated through an explicit theory
based on loss-functions, Taylor argues that such a
model provides a reasonable approximation to the
actual operating procedures of the OMD. The
second term on the right-hand side implies that
the OMD fully responds to control errors, ωt. This
can be seen by rearranging equation (8),
,
and solving backwards to obtain 
(9) .
Equation (9) implies a slow adjustment of Bt to
changes in the desired level of nonborrowed
reserves—when Bt
* rises by one percent, Bt increases
by the fraction α. Over time, Bt will rise by an addi-
tional (1–α) percent so that Bt and Bt
* track each
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–, we obtain reduced-form expressions for
both Bt and rt:
(10)     
(11)
There are two important implications that can be
obtained from these expressions. First, the interest
rate equation implies that deviations of the over-
night rate from its target, rt–rt
–, will be positively
correlated if the target level displays persistence.
This is a realistic feature of the data, documented
by Balduzzi, Bertola, and Silvero (1997) and more
recently by Taylor (2001).1 In the extreme case of
full adjustment, α=1 and deviations of the funds
rate from its target are i.i.d. as in Thornton’s
model. This restriction is clearly at odds with the
data, however.
The second important implication is that a
regression of nonborrowed reserves on the federal
funds target will yield a biased estimate of λ. To
see this, suppose that the target rate follows an
AR(1) stochastic process 
(12)
and consider estimating the following regression:
(13)
In this case, one can show that
(14)
In the case that rt
– is i.i.d., the bias is λ(1–α), which
depends on the degree of partial adjustment of Bt
to Bt
*. In the case that rt
– is a random walk, the
bias is zero since the parameter estimate is super-
consistent. More generally, the fact that rt is
stationary, but changes in discrete intervals at
discrete points in time, suggests that the bias could
vary substantially across sample periods. Finally,
assigning the bias (and interpreting coefficient
values) will be even more complicated when both
the change and the level of the target funds rate are
included on the right-hand side of the regression.
In summary, developing a complete structural
model of the daily reserves market seems like a
plim ˆ . θλλ ρ
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worthy goal. Understanding daily movements in
the federal funds market and the link between open
market operations and monetary policy actions
requires the correct specification of all the structural
equations that describe this market. The results in
Thornton’s paper suggest to me that one cannot
identify structural parameters associated with the
liquidity effect without taking into account all the
equations in the system. In particular, the fact that
the interest rate equation in Thornton’s model is
clearly misspecified implies that other equations
in the reduced-form system are also likely mis-
specified. These insights can be used to modify and
refine the model, however. In addition to providing
a very useful analysis of past work using daily data
to identify the liquidity effect, Thornton’s paper
sets us on a path toward such refinements.
Finally, I wish to end with a note of caution.
The elasticity of money demand to interest rates
that enters the dynamic general equilibrium models
discussed above is not directly linked to the demand
for reserves by banks on a daily or weekly basis. In
particular, the elasticity of demand for reservable
deposits by banks represents a short-run elasticity
that may not say very much about the costs and
benefits to firms and households of switching be-
tween money and alternative assets in response to
changes in nominal interest rates. Although clearly
interrelated, it is presumably the firms’ and house-
holds’ demand for real balances rather than the
banking sector’s demand for reserves that Milton
Friedman referred to when coining the term
“liquidity effect.”
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